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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the repayment performance in microfinance programs in Malaysia that apply 
individual lending approach. The research framework of this study is built by four factors namely 
individual/borrower factors, firm/business factors, loan factors and institutional/lender factors as 
independent variables and repayment performance either paid on time, delinquent and default as 
dependent variables. The study used a mixed-method combining between quantitative and qualitative 
data through questionnaire survey, in-depth interviews, published and unpublished reports. The data 
of this study is gathered from 401 respondents in Peninsular Malaysia through multistage random 
sampling. The data is analysed by descriptive analysis and multinomial logit model. Meanwhile, for 
qualitative data, a total of 21 respondents (7 respondents who paid on time, 7 respondents who 
delinquent and 7 respondents who default) were selected randomly and structured interviews with 6 
MFI’s State Managers. The results show that in terms of borrower characteristics, only micro 
entrepreneur’s religious education level is statistically significant in the relationship between 
delinquent and good borrowers and between default and good borrowers. Whereas, in firm/business 
characteristics, the result shows that distance, business formality and total sales are statistically 
significant. The finding shows that total loan received, loan type and repayment schedule are the loan 
characteristics that affect micro entrepreneur’s loan repayment. In terms of institutional/lender 
characteristics, the finding shows that loan monitoring is statistically significant in the relationship 
between delinquent and good borrowers. This study contributes significantly to the knowledge of 
microfinance program at large, wherein it explains the factors affecting repayment performance and 
repayment performance plays an important role to ensure that MFIs can continue providing 
microfinance to the micro entrepreneurs without depending on subsidies.  
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1. Introduction 
Microfinance has been recognized as an essential socio-economic and financial mechanism for 
poverty alleviation, promoting entrepreneurial development and increasing the profile of 
disadvantaged people in numerous countries throughout the world (Hossain et al., 2012). Microfinance 
serves to promote rural livelihoods and urban poor by the creation of entrepreneurship opportunities 
that encourage the elimination of unemployment by creating potential business based on their interest 
and skill.  Microfinance targets to poor people because these people usually lack of collateral, no 
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steady employment and verifiable credit history, which therefore, cannot even meet the most minimal 
qualifications to gain access to normal banking. Besides, it can avoid poor people lend with illegal 
banking such as moneylender or loan shark that charge unreasonable interest rate. 
However repayment problem that because of adverse selection and moral hazard has become an 
obstacle to the Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) especially that offer microfinance based on 
individual lending approach to maintain their funds. This is because most of the MFIs are Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that received funds from donors and government and they are 
not profit-oriented organisation. In Malaysia, repayment problem faced by many semi- formal 
financial institutions that offer credit to micro enterprises and Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) is on 
the high side (Starbiz, 2 June 2010). For example, in 2008, the Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) for 
TEKUN Nasional are 29 percent, SME Bank is 8 percent, Suruhanjaya Koperasi Malaysia (SKM) is 
13.8 percent and Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) is 11 percent (Utusan Malaysia, 16 December 
2008). While, the NPLs for Perbadanan Usahawan Nasional Berhad (PUNB) is 30 percent for Retail 
PROSPER Scheme and 20 percent for Graduate PROSPER Scheme and PKS Scheme (Berita Harian, 
16 February 2009). Until 2012, the NPLs for TEKUN Nasional is still high which is 20 percent 
(TEKUN Nasional, 2012).  
Therefore this paper tries to analyze the repayment performance in microfinance programs in Malaysia 
that apply individual lending approach. This paper is divided into five sections where section one is 
the introduction followed by literature review in section two. Section three discusses the methodology 
used and section four explains the result and discussion. While the last chapter is conclusion and 
research recommendations. 
2. Literature Review 
The concept of microfinance has been existed in the early 1700s initiated by Jonathan Swift in Ireland. 
The organization provides small loans to rural poor with no collateral known as Irish Loan Fund 
System. The principal purpose was making small loans with interest for short periods (CGAP, 2006). 
In 1864, the concept of credit union was developed by Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen in Germany to 
assist the rural population break out of their dependence on moneylenders. The focus of this institution 
was mostly on savings mobilization in rural areas in an attempt to help poor farmers how to save. The 
benchmark model for many microcredit programs in the world is Grameen Bank in Bangladesh that 
was established in 1983 by Mohammad Yunus, a Professor at Chittagong University (Hossain, 1988; 
Yunus, 1999). 
Majority of the literature on repayment performance of MFIs focused on group- based lending or 
group liability because group based lending is synonym with microfinance activities such as Ghatak 
and Guinnane (1999), Godquin (2004), Sharma and Zeller (1997), Zeller, (1998), Besley and Coates 
(1995), and Silwal (2003). Much theorizing has been done to show the advantages of group loan in 
minimizing the default rate compared to an individual loan (Ghatak, 2000; Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999; 
Besley & Coate, 1995; Maata, 2004).  Much of the studies emphasized the role of joint liability in 
group lending, such as peer selection (Ghatak, 1999), peer monitoring (Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990; 
Banerjee et al., 1994), and peer enforcement (Besley & Coates, 1995). It proved that through group 
lending, it could mitigate moral hazard, adverse selection and information asymmetries faced by the 
MFIs. Microfinance programs that used peer selection, peer monitoring, dynamic incentives, regular 
repayment schedules, and social collateral help maintain high repayment rates (Silwal, 2003; Tesfaye, 
2009). 
However, not all MFIs offer microfinance based on group lending because of many reasons such as 
the borrowers need larger loans, have difficulty to find group members and difficulty to attend weekly 
meeting. The literature on repayment performance in individual lending approach is very sparse and 
limited mainly to microfinance experience in low-income countries (Suraya Hanim Mokhtar, 2011;   
Derban et al., 2005; Silwal, 2003). Many researchers have emphasized the importance of loan 
repayment performance such as Sangoro et al., (2012), Stearns (1995) and Hulme and Mosley (1996). 
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Examining repayment performance is important because if borrowers do not repay, then there may not 
be sufficient funds to ensure that the liquidity position of the MFI is maintained. When there is a loss 
in the bank liquidity due to high levels of non-repayment, the cyclical flow of funds between the MFI 
and the borrowers will be interrupted. 
There are various factors including individual/borrower characteristics, borrower’s firm 
characteristics, MFI characteristics and loan characteristics that will affect the willingness and the 
ability of borrowers to repay their loans. On the other hand, the borrowers may not able to repay their 
loans due to factors beyond their control such as flood, earthquake and economic recession. The 
borrowers may default when the return of their business is too small or when the return is just enough 
to cover the scheduled payment and they decide not to pay their loans by choice (strategic default). 
Before the lender grant credit to the borrower, he must predict the probability of the borrower to repay 
the loan and usually financial institutions use credit scoring model to characterize the repayment 
behavior of borrowers (Frydman et al., 1985; Boyes et al., 1989; Turvey, 1991). However, the credit 
scoring used in financial institution is not relevant for most borrowers in MFIs because their business 
is small and involved in informal activities and some businesses are just start their operation, so the 
financial information of the business is unavailable. Therefore, MFIs need to construct a relevant 
probability model mainly rely on the data that observable and can be estimated by loan officer. 
3. Methodology 
The study applies mixed methodology by combining between quantitative data and qualitative data 
through questionnaire survey, in- depth interviews with selected MFI’s state managers and borrowers. 
According to Creswell (2002), the mixed methods design can be used to generalize findings to a 
population and develop detailed views of the meaning of a phenomenon or concept for individuals. 
Mixed methods research is a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches in many phases in 
the research process. As a method, it focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative 
and qualitative data in a single study for better understanding of research problems. Some researchers 
also called mixed methods as triangulation methods (Bryman, 2004; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Morse, 
1991). However, the quantitative methodology is the main study and the qualitative methodology as 
explanatory or supporting method.  
For questionnaire survey, a total of 401 respondents were selected randomly based on multi stage 
random sampling from all states in Peninsular Malaysia. The study uses descriptive analysis and 
multinomial logit analysis to analyse the data. For analysis purpose, the borrowers are classified into 
three groups as good borrowers who repaid on time, delinquent borrowers who repaid three months 
from the due date and default borrowers who did not repay in full after six months from the due date. 
The data is based on their credit status on sampling date. The general approach is intended to explain 
why a particular population group falls under the three credit repayment categories. Based on past 
literature, the variables which may significantly affect repayment performance on the basis of the 
study are determined quantitatively in the model implicitly specified as follows:- 
Repayment Performance = f (individual/borrower characteristics, firm/business characteristics, loan 
characteristics, institutional/lender characteristics) 
Or, 
Y = f( AGE, SEX, EDU, RELEDU, BUSEXP, MNTHINCM, BUSSTAT, LIFEBUSS, DISTNC, 
BUSSEC, AREAOPT, BUSFOM, FIRMPFT, AMNTLOAN, LOANTYP, PYMTPER, PYMTSCHD,  
LOANMON, TRANCOST) 
 
Where, 
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Y = repayment performance with values reflecting the repayment status of the borrowers either 1 (paid 
on time), 2 (delinquency) and 3 (default). 
 
 
Age   AGE   Age of the respondent in years 
Sex   SEX   0 if male and 1 if female 
Education  EDU   0 if respondent has attend secondary and below  
Level  and 1 if respondent has professional certificate and 
above 
Religious             RELEDU  A vector of dummy variables indicating religious  
Education Level                                          education level between borrowers where [dummy                 
1 = 1 if none and 0 if otherwise, dummy 2 =   
                                                                       1 if respondent attend primary level only and 
0 if otherwise and, dummy 3 = 1 if respondent                              
attend until secondary level and 0 if otherwise.] 
Business                     BUSXEP  Respondent business experience (in years) 
Experience 
Monthly Income        MNTHINCM  Total household income per month (in RM) 
Business Status          BUSSTAT  0 if permanent and 1 if temporary                                          
Life of Business LIFEBUS  Number of years 
Distance from             DISTNC   in kilometers 
Lender Office 
Business Sector           BUSSEC A vector of dummy variables indicating   business   
sector of the borrowers where 
  [dummy 1 = 1 if services and 0 if otherwise, 
                                                   dummy 2 =  1 if manufacturing and 0 if 
                                                 otherwise and dummy 3 = 1 if agriculture 
and 0 if otherwise.] 
Area of Operation AREAOPT  0 if rural areas and 1 if urban areas 
Business Formality BUSFOM  0 if registered with SSM and 1 if not 
Firm’s profit             FIRMPFT  Total sales per month (in RM) 
Amount of Loan AMNTLOAN  Total amount received (RM) 
Received 
Loan Type                  LOANTYP   A vector of dummy variables indicating               
  loan type between borrowers where 
  [dummy 1 = 1 if first loan and 0 if otherwise,  
  dummy 2 = 1 if second time loan and 0 if 
   otherwise, dummy 3 = 1 if third time loan and 0   if 
otherwise, dummy 4 = 1 if fourth time loan  
                                                                         and 0 if otherwise and, dummy 5 = 1 if fifth time  
                                                                         loan and 0 if otherwise.] 
Repayment Period    PYMTPER  Repayment period in years 
Repayment               PYMTSCHD  A vector of dummy variables indicating            
Schedule                                                          repayment schedule between borrowers where 
                                                                        [dummy 1 = 1 if weekly and 0 if otherwise, 
                                                                        dummy 2 = 1 if bi-weekly and 0 if otherwise 
 and dummy 3 = 1 if monthly and 0 if otherwise] 
Loan Monitoring     LOANMON   number of times borrowers were visited by loan  
   officer in a month. 
Transaction Cost      TRANCOST 1 if loan processed and disbursed in time and 0 if 
otherwise. 
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To support the data from questionnaire survey, informal interviews with 21 selected borrowers and 
structured interview with 6 MFI’s State Managers were conducted to identify the factors that affect 
borrower’s repayment performance.  
 
4. Result and Discussion 
The aim of descriptive statistics is to summarize large quantities of data by a few numbers and, to 
highlight the most important numerical features of the data (Antonius, 2003).  Based on descriptive 
analysis, the results show that the mean age of respondents is 42 and most of the respondents are 
married. 229 respondents are female, and the rests are males who contribute 172 from total 
respondents. In terms of education level, majority of respondents just finish their secondary school and 
below. Average of respondents has nine-year business experience and the average of total household 
income per month is RM4, 149 (USD1,484). In terms of business location, majority of respondents 
operate their business in rural areas where most of them involved in services and retail activities such 
as retail shop, hawker stalls, salon and restaurant. Based on 401 respondents, 208 (51.9%) respondents 
are categorised as good borrowers, while 123 (30.7%) respondents are delinquent and 70 (17.5%) 
respondents are default borrowers.  
 
In terms of factors affecting repayment performance, table 4.1 has shown the multinomial logit 
estimation model of loan repayment performance.  A positive coefficient indicates that an increase in 
the independent variable score will result in an increase probability of being in the delinquent and 
default category than that of being in the paid on time category. On the other hand, a negative 
coefficient indicates that an increase in the independent variable score will result in a decreased 
probability of being in the delinquent and default category (Pallant, 2011; Hair et al., 2010).  In terms 
of relationship between delinquent borrower with good borrower, table 4.1 has shown that gender, 
business experience, education level, distance, total loan and transaction cost have positive coefficient 
while, age, religious education level, total income, business sector, business status, year of 
establishment, business area, register with SSM, total sales, loan type, repayment schedule, repayment 
period and loan monitoring have negative coefficient in relationship between delinquent borrowers 
and good borrowers. However, only religious education level, distance, register with SSM, total sales, 
repayment schedule and loan monitoring are statistically significant with a significant level 90 percent 
and 95 percent (p ≤ 0.05 or p ≤ 0.1). 
 
While, in terms of relationship between default borrower with good borrower, the findings has shown 
that gender, age, business sector, year of establishment, distance, business area, total loan, repayment 
schedule, repayment period, monthly installment and loan monitoring have positive coefficient while, 
business experience, education level, religious education level, total income, business status, register 
with SSM, total sales, loan type and transaction cost have negative coefficient. However, only 
religious education level, distance, total sales, total loan and loan type are statistically significant with 
a significant level at 1 percent (p ≤ 0.01), 5 percent (p ≤ 0.05) and 10 percent (p ≤ 0.1). 
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Table 4.1 
Multinomial Logit Estimation Model of Loan Repayment Performance 
 
  Delinquent Default 
Variables Coefficient Z p-value Coefficient Z p-value 
Gender 0.351567 1.404 0.1604 0.153033 0.4668 0.6406 
Age -0.018921 -1.197 0.2311 0.008383 0.4307 0.6667 
Business Experience 0.010103 0.3749 0.7077 -0.013039 -0.3787 0.7049 
Education Level 0.131965 0.3865 0.6991 -0.137517 -0.2627 0.7928 
Religious Education 
Level 
-0.401959 
-1.867 
0.0619* -0.721468 
-2.641 
0.0083*** 
Total Income -0.000030 -0.9512 0.3415 -0.000146 -1.547 0.1218 
Business Sector -0.138629 -0.5111 0.6093 0.041813 0.1253 0.9003 
Business Status -0.043884 -0.1161 0.9076 -0.079565 -0.1702 0.8649 
Year of Establishment -0.000971 -0.03528 0.9719 0.040552 1.192 0.2331 
Distance 0.027291 2.05 0.0404** 0.063982 3.698 0.0002*** 
Business Area -0.022344 -0.07892 0.9371 0.474397 1.225 0.2206 
Register SSM -1.250172 -2.229 0.0258** -0.612843 -1.074 0.2827 
Total Sales -0.000122 -1.906 0.0566* -0.000646 -3.230 0.0012*** 
Total Loan 0.000034 1.255 0.2093 0.000055 1.791 0.0733* 
Loan Type -0.037775 -0.222 0.8243 -0.495149 -2.032 0.0421** 
Repayment Schedule -0.352202 -1.794 0.0728* 0.087092 0.345 0.7301 
Repayment Period -0.010031 -0.07494 0.9403 0.146832 0.8263 0.4086 
Monthly Installment -0.000397 -0.4738 0.6356 0.000898 0.8842 0.3766 
Loan Monitoring -0.248618 -2.033 0.0420** 0.202647 1.294 0.1958 
Transaction Cost 0.120762 0.4755 0.6344 -0.025788 -0.0725 0.9422 
Reference category = Paid on-time  
*** Significant @ 1% level, ** significant @ 5% level, * significant @ 10% level 
Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 235 (58.6%) 
Likelihood ratio test: Chi-square(40) = 111.727 [0.0000] 
 
 
Based on the findings above, the result shows that only borrower’s religious education level is 
statistically significant at p ≤ 0.1 level for the relationship between delinquent borrower and good 
borrower and highly significant at p ≤ 0.01 in the relationship between default borrower and good 
borrower. The result has shown that the higher religious education level of the borrowers, the higher 
probability of the borrowers to repay their loan on time. In Islam, responsible to pay debt is highly 
important where even the borrowers were dead, they still have to pay their debt or their soul will be 
hanging. The result has shown that borrowers who belief in Islam is more responsible to payback their 
loans even they are in difficult time because they know the consequence of not paying the loans. Such 
actions could be faith-related and it has been argued that borrowers may be more likely to repay their 
loans because their religious values dictate the fulfillment of their contracts or repayment of debts 
(Khan & Thaut, 2010). The result is parallel with the result from interviews with respondents where 
majority of the good borrowers repay their loans because they know the consequences of not payback 
the debt in Islam.  
 
In terms of firm characteristics factor that affect loan repayment performance, the result has revealed 
that distance, register with SSM and total sales are statistically significant. The result has shown that 
distance to the lender office may influence borrower’s repayment status where the farther the 
borrower’s business to the lender office, the higher probability of borrowers to delinquent and default. 
The result is statistically significant at p ≤ 0.1 level in the relationship between delinquent borrower 
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and good borrower and highly statistically significant at p ≤ 0.01 in the relationship between default 
borrower and good borrower. The result is in line with other previous studies (Oke et al., 2007; 
Onyenucheya & Ukoha, 2007; Bhatt & Tang, 2002; Arene, 1992) who found that an increase in 
distance between borrower’s business premise and lender office will reduce repayment rate. 
 
The formality of the business is another factor that influences borrower repayment status where the 
finding has shown that businesses who registered with Company Commission of Malaysia 
(Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia (SSM)) are more likely to repay the loan on time compared with 
businesses that did not registered with SSM. A higher degree of business formality demonstrated a 
better repayment rate (Pisani & Yoskowitz, 2004). The result also shows that total sales is an 
important factor in determining borrower’s loan repayment performance where the finding has 
revealed a strong effect at p ≤ 0.01 in the relationship between default borrower and good borrower 
and at p ≤ 0.1 in the relationship between delinquent borrower and good borrower. The result shows 
that borrowers who get higher total sales per month are more creditworthy than borrowers who get less 
total sales per month. The result is parallel with the result found by Nannyonga (2000); Onyenucheya 
& Ukoha (2007); Oke et al., (2007); Von Pischke (1991) who found that borrowers who get higher 
profit, have higher chance of repaying their loans compared to borrowers who declare less profit.  
 
The finding has shown that total loan received, loan type and repayment schedule are the loan 
characteristics factor that statistically significant at p ≤ 0.1 and p ≤ 0.01 level. The result shows a 
strong effect at p ≤ 0.01 in the relationship between default borrower and good borrower where the 
bigger total loan received by the borrowers, the higher probability of the borrowers to default. When 
the borrowers received more loans, there is the tendency that the excess loan may be diverted to other 
unproductive, non for business uses such as for personal use, children’s school fees and pay other debt 
(Norell, 2001). Even the Grameen Bank clients used their loans for many different purposes such as 
food consumption, health, and education (Collins et al., 2009). Based on the interview with 
respondents, six of them admit that they use some of the loan given for other things such as to 
renovate house, children education and to buy things such as hand phone. 
 
Besides, the result has revealed that loan type (dynamic incentive) is statistically significant at p ≤ 0.1 
level in the relationship between default borrower and good borrower where the increasing number of 
time the borrowers received loan from the same MFI, the higher probability of the borrowers to pay on 
time. Dynamic incentives consist of a threat and an opportunity which is the threat of being cut off 
from future loans and the opportunity of borrowing larger amounts in the future (Berglind & Karimi, 
2007). 
 
The finding also shows a negative effect between delinquent borrowers and good borrowers in terms 
of repayment schedule where the repayment schedule is statistically significant at p ≤ 0.1 level. The 
result shows that the monthly type of repayment schedule is more likely to be a good borrower than a 
delinquent borrower. The result is contradict with previous study such as Guttman (2007) who found 
that weekly repayment basis is more suitable because it can identified defaulters early and can be 
pushed by the bank officer to “keep step” in their loan repayment. However, Field & Pande (2008) 
found that no significant effect of type of repayment schedule either weekly or monthly on client 
delinquency and default. They suggest a more flexible schedule to the clients because it can reduce 
transaction costs. 
 
In terms of institutional factors that affect loan repayment performance, the findings has shown that 
loan monitoring is statistically significant at p ≤ 0.05 level in the relationship between delinquent 
borrowers and good borrowers. The result shows that the more frequent the MFIS officers visit 
borrowers’ business premise, the higher probability of the borrowers to pay on time. The result is 
parallel with previous studies such as Deininger and Liu (2009); Papias and Ganesan (2009) and 
Olomola (2000) which found that loan monitoring is an important factor in increasing loan repayment 
rate among borrowers.   
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendation 
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The importance of microfinance facilities to the development of micro entrepreneurs in the world have 
been proven that microfinance can help micro entrepreneurs to get credit to finance their business 
activities or to get capital to set up the business. This is because majority of them are denied from 
commercial banking credit because lack of collateral as needed by the banks. However, giving credit 
to the micro entrepreneurs is high risk because of limited financial capabilities and the business has 
not been stable. Therefore, to help MFIs especially that using individual-lending approach to mitigate 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems and to determine factors affecting micro entrepreneur’s 
loan repayment,  the study suggests imposing maximum current loan instalment per monthly income 
like practiced by commercial banks where the current instalment not more than two third of the 
monthly income. Besides, the MFIs should matching the repayment schedule and the expecting of 
receiving income such as agriculture borrower that usually receive income after harvesting time, the 
repayment is based on harvest time not based on regular repayment period. 
 
The MFIs can also differentiate between applying loan for start up the business and for working 
capital purpose because normally who apply for start up the business are new entrepreneurs and have 
less experience in business. They not only need credit but more than credit such as business training 
like how to promote their product, prepare financial statement and the presentable of the product. 
Therefore, it is suggested to provide related training skills to the new entrepreneurs to enhance their 
business skills. Moreover, the lower the number of months the business operated, the higher the risk 
for the business to survive because businesses are more likely to fail within the first year of operation. 
 
While to increase the loan repayment, it is proposed to MFIs to increase the monitoring system by 
introducing peer monitoring like imposed in the group lending approach. This can be applied through 
Entrepreneur Club where success borrowers can monitor new or problem borrowers to manage and to 
solve their business problems like mentor mentee program.  Besides that, this can reduce the 
operational cost of MFIs in monitoring their clients. In addition to the dynamic incentive where on 
time borrowers and borrowers who finish repay their loan will be offered for bigger loan, the MFIs can 
also give rebate to those who succeed paying their instalment on time or make full repayment early. 
This can encourage the borrowers to repay on time and to make full repayment early when they have 
extra income. Besides that, this can eliminate borrower’s perception towards microfinance loans where 
microfinance loans is not important and can delay the payment.  
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